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CONSUMER NEWS
Cost-Cutting Schemes Could End up
Costing Parent Corporations
By Jeremy LaMarche'
The Supreme Court of Illinois recently handed down a deci-
sion that may force parent companies to be more cautious when im-
plementing new budgetary, financial, and marketing schemes. Re-
cently, the Court decided Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc. and held that a
parent company could be liable to a subsidiary's employee. The
Court stated that the employee must prove that the parent company
directed or authorized the implementation of its subsidiary's budget
while disregarding the discretion and interests of the subsidiary.3
In 1995, Clark USA, a holding company, decided to imple-
ment a strategic business plan whereby it would replenish its cash re-
serve by decreasing capital spending to minimum sustainable levels.
4
In order to accomplish this, the Directors of Clark USA created a new
budget for its subsidiary, Clark Refining, which was aimed at posi-
tioning the subsidiary corporation as a low cost refiner and marketer.
5
The Directors of both the parent and subsidiary met several times in
order to discuss the implementation of the new budget.6 Paul Mel-
nuck, who served as President of Clark USA as well as CEO of Clark
Refining, oversaw the planning.7
In 1996 and 1997, plaintiffs Marguerite Forsythe and Eliza-
J.D. candidate, May 2007, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A.,
Political Science and History, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
2 Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 2007 WL 495292 at * 12 (11 2007).
3 Forsythe, 2007 WL 495292 at * 12.
4 Id. at *2.
5Id.
6id.
7id.
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beth Szabla, as special administrators of the estates of their late hus-
bands, filed suit against Clark Refining and other defendants.8 The
plaintiffs later added the parent company, Clark USA, as a defen-
dant.9 On March 13, 1995, the plaintiffs' husbands Michael Forsythe
and Gary Szabla, two mechanics who worked at Clark Refining, were
killed in a fire on the job.'0 Other Clark Refining employees caused
the fire when they attempted to replace a pipe's valve without first
ensuring that the flammable materials in the pipe had been depressur-
ized. I The plaintiffs alleged that Clark USA breached its duty of rea-
sonable care when it implemented its budget strategy.' 2 More spe-
cifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Clark USA breached its duty by
forcing Clark Refinery to employ unqualified employees as mainte-
nance mechanics in order to conform to the new budget strategy. 13
After the close of discovery, the trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Clark USA.14 Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed
and the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and remanded the summary
judgment ruling.' Following that decision, Clark USA petitioned the
Supreme Court of Illinois for leave to appeal, and the Court granted
the defendant's petition.16
There were two issues in front of the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois in Forsythe v. Clark USA.' 7 The first issue was whether a parent
company could be held liable under a theory of direct participant li-
ability for controlling its subsidiary's budget in a way that led to a
workplace accident.' The second issue was, if such a theory of di-
rect participation liability is recognized, whether the exclusive-
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act immunizes a
parent company from liability. 19 The exclusive-remedy provision of
8 Forsythe, 2007 WL 495292 at * 2.
9 Id.
'
0 Id. at * 1.
1 Id.
12 Id.
13 Forsythe, 2007 WL 495292 at * 1.
14 id.
15 id.
16 Id.
17 id.
18 Forsythe, 2007 WL 495292 at * 1.
]9 1d.
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the Act prohibits an employee from bringing an action against his or
her employer if compensation is already provided under the Workers'
Compensation Act.
2F
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that direct par-
ticipation liability is a valid theory of recovery under Illinois law.21
The Court stated that in order for a parent company to be held liable
to a third party or an employee under this theory of recovery, it must
be shown that the parent company mandated an overall business
strategy and carried out that strategy through specific direction or au-
thorization, surpassing the control exercised as a normal incident of
ownership, in disregard for the interests of the subsidiary company.22
The Court further noted that the key elements of direct participation
liability included a parent company's "specific direction or authoriza-
tion of the manner in which an activity is undertaken" as well as fore-
seeability that an injury will occur.23 Further, the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act did not bar suit against a parent company under a
theory of direct participation liability.24 The Court affirmed and re-
manded the case back to the circuit court to determine whether the di-
rect participation theory should be applied to these particular facts.
25
Prior to the Supreme Court of Illinois' decision in Forsythe, a
parent corporation could not be held liable for the acts of its subsidi-
ary unless the corporate veil could be pierced.26 This only occurred
when the parent company exercised "complete domination" over the
subsidiary and its decision-making. 27 Under this theory, the party
seeking to pierce the corporate veil must make a substantial showing
that the corporation is really a dummy or sham for another dominat-
ing entity. 2" The decision in Forsythe will not do away with the re-
20 Workers' Compensation Act, 820 111. Comp. Stat. 305/5 (1995).
21 Forsythe, 2007 WL 495292, at *8.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at * 1.
25 Id. at *12.
26 Brooks, Edward & Walls. Court Allows Another Way to Pierce the Veil.
Chi. Daily Law Bull., February 2, 2006, available at www.drinkerbiddle.com/... /
74bac382-38f2-48c 1-b9fc-06e9bOfSecal / CourtAllowsAnotherWayToPierceTheV-
eil.pdf (last visited May 8, 2007).
27 Brooks, Edwards & Walls, supra note 26.
28 Jacobson v. Buffalo Rock Shooters Supply Inc., 278 Ill.App.3d 1084, 1088
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
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quirements of the corporate veil theory in Illinois, however.29
The Supreme Court of Illinois stated in its opinion that the di-
rect participation theory of liability will only give rise to a duty in
"limited circumstances."30 The Court pointed out that the direct par-
ticipation theory of liability is not like piercing the corporate veil
where the liability of the subsidiary is the liability of the parent.
3
'
Rather, this form of liability is assigned when the "parent's direct
participation" supersedes the discretion and interest of the subsidiary
and creates conditions that lead to a dangerous activity such as limit-
ing the budget of the subsidiary. 32 However, the decision in Forsythe
will make parent companies more vulnerable to potential liability for
the control they assert over their subsidiaries.
As a result of the direct participation theory of liability, parent
companies might find themselves entertaining lawsuits from plain-
tiffs other than employees of their subsidiaries. For example, this
theory of recovery would likely allow a non-employee of the subsidi-
ary to recover from a parent company if the individual happens to be
injured while on the subsidiary's job site or by a subsidiary's em-
ployee.33 Further, this theory of liability may be used in scenarios
where poor financial decisions by the parent company cause financial
injury to the subsidiarY and ultimately to those with a financial inter-
est in the subsidiary.
3 4
Among other things, the Supreme Court of Illinois has put
parent companies on notice that the financial and safety conse-
quences of their decisions should be considered and weighed prior to
implementing any major cost-cutting schemes. Parent companies
will no longer be able to fully direct the finances of a subsidiary
while at the same time hiding behind the exclusive remedy provision
of the Workers' Compensation Act.
29 Brooks, Edwards & Walls, supra note 26.
30 Forsythe, 2007 WL 495292, at *12.
' Id. at *11.
32 Id.
33 Susan Condon. Illinois Opinion Increases Liability Exposure of Parent
Corporations. CM Reports. (August 2005) available at http://www.clausen.com/
dir-docs/firm_pubs/fab3 1 a04-60ef-48ee-a615-f8a58736f65apdfdocument.pdf
14 Kirk Hartley, Mindy Finnigan & Kevin Mueller. Parent Companies-Safe,
Or Not, When Bad Things Happen At Subsidiaries? (April 2006).
http://www.butlerrubin.com/web/br.nsf/0/9365A27FF400AA7A86257145006DOF8
9/$FILE/w0022594.pdf
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